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Abstract 
 
Almost a decade after their initiation, financial reforms appear to have had little effect on the 
economies of Sub-Sahara Africa. Whether the blame is to fall on their initial design itself, or on the 
partial nature of their implementation, liberalization policies have not mobilized savings, deepened 
intermediation or raised investment. Yet, Africa needs properly functioning financial markets for a 
more efficient allocation of resources for growth and risk diversification.  How can African 
governments “correct’ their approach towards financial policy reform? A first step towards refining 
future policy choices requires an assessment of the short African experience with financial reform. 
How has progress in institutional and policy reform affected the financial depth of these economies? 
How have the gains in financial depth, if any, affected saving, consumption and investment? How does 
the African reform experience compare with that of other developing countries? How do the countries 
that during the period of reforms experienced substantial increases in aggregate saving compare to 
those that experienced substantial declines? These are some of the key issues we address in this paper. 
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. I. Introduction 
By the late 1980's and early 1990's, against an unfavorable background of rapidly deteriorating 
economic and financial conditions, many countries in Sub-Sahara Africa undertook far reaching 
economic reforms. Within the framework of IMF and World Bank supported structural adjustment 
programs, these countries were to restructure their economies, in order to achieve private sector led 
growth, through a market based system.1  
Financial liberalization was a significant component of these reforms.  Countries were to grant 
their central banks more autonomy in conducting monetary policy, liberalize interest rates, avoid or 
abolish the direct allocation of credit, implement monetary policy through indirect instruments, 
restructure and privatize banks and, more generally, develop and foster the environment for the proper 
functioning of financial markets. 2 All in the hope of reversing decades of financial repression, and 
enabling their economies to grow faster.  
                                                 
1See Wold Bank(1994) 
2See Mehran et. all (1998) 
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Today, almost a decade after their initiation, financial reforms appear to have affected the 
economies in Sub-Sahara Africa very little. 3 Whether the blame is to fall on their initial design itself, 
or on the difficulties and partial nature of their implementation, liberalization policies have seemed 
insufficient in mobilizing savings, deepening intermediation through the financial sector, or raising 
investment. Yet, Africa needs properly functioning financial markets badly. Both for a more efficient 
allocation of resources, and, perhaps more importantly, for a more efficient and growth inducing risk 
diversification.  How can African governments refine, correct and invigorate their approach towards 
financial policy reform? How can they enhance the effectiveness of their interventions and measures? 
The first step towards refining future policy choices requires an accurate assessment of the short 
African experience with financial reform. How has progress in institutional and policy reform, 
whatever its extent, affected the financial depth of the African economies? How have the gains in 
financial depth, if any, affected saving, consumption and investment? How does the African reform 
experience in these regards, so far,  compare with that of other developing countries? Has the 
experience of the poorer countries in the region been comparable to that of the more advanced middle 
income countries? Has the level of indebtedness affected the experience with financial liberalization in 
Sub-Sahara Africa? How do the countries that during the period of reforms experienced substantial 
increases in aggregate saving compare to the countries that experienced substantial declines. 
                                                 
3See Nissanke and Aryeetey(1998) for a comprehensive analysis and a detailed 
investigation of financial reforms in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania. Collier and 
Gunning(1999) make a similar assessment within their broader examination of African economic 
performance.   
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These questions inspire our study, which proceeds as follows.  In section II, we briefly review 
the main analytical lenses through which we can understand  the consequences of financial 
liberalization on consumption and saving. In section III, we review the relevant empirical evidence on  
the effects of financial liberalization in developing countries. In section IV, we describe our 
methodology and proceed to establish the aggregate profile of the reform process in Africa. First, we 
compare the experience of Sub-Saharan countries to that of other developing countries. Second, in 
order to understand the diversity of responses within the African group, we examine the association of 
the progress in financial development, the level of income, and the level of indebtedness with the 
picture that emerges after the reforms. Finally we take a closer look at those countries that did 
substantially better or worse, in terms of aggregate saving ratios during liberalization.  The last section 
discusses some of the policy implications of our findings. 
 Section II.  Analytical Background 
Financial liberalization entails reform along a number of distinct but interrelated dimensions: 
liberalization of the interest rates, reduction in reserve requirements, partial or complete abandonment 
of directed credit, privatization of the banking and wider financial sector, establishing and fostering the 
development of securities markets.  The above exercises in deregulation and building of market 
mechanisms are expected to be accompanied by an exercise in re-regulation: measures that enhance 
the competitiveness of the financial environment and guarantee the soundness of operations through 
increased prudential oversight. Finally, but no less importantly, the reforms adopted on the domestic 
front may be accompanied by measures that increase openness through the current and capital account 
transactions. 
All these reform measures, individually and in combination, are expected to affect saving and 
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investment through their effect on asset returns and their characteristics, and through their effect on the 
availability and allocation of credit. We discuss in turn the models that may shed some light on the 
anticipated effects of financial liberalization through each one of these prime channels of influence. 
1. The interest rate channel 
At least since McKinnon(1973) and Shaw(1973), the presumption is that growth in a 
financially repressed environment is hindered primarily by the low level of saving, not the lack of 
investment opportunities. Controlled interest rates reflect capital scarcity inaccurately, inducing 
inefficient mis-allocation of resources. They prohibit appropriate risk-taking by financial institutions, 
as they eliminate  or reduce the scope for risk premia. Lifting controls on interest rates, allows them to 
increase to levels that stimulate higher saving. Assuming a strong responsiveness of saving to interest 
rates, higher interest rates are expected to reduce disintermediation. Within this optimistic framework, 
financial liberalization produces higher interest rates and higher savings that, in turn, induce higher 
and better quality investment, and, ultimately economic growth. 
Of course, within the standard intertemporal model the effect of a change in interest rates on 
consumption and saving is ambiguous. Its income and substitution effects work in opposite directions. 
Higher returns on saving raises the stream of future income and wealth, raising current consumption. 
At the same time, postponing current consumption allows for higher future consumption, as returns on 
saving have gone up. In such a framework the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is crucial in 
determining the direction of change in savings that follows an increase in the interest rate. 
Further, Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart(1996) have shown that the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution may itself depend on the level of permanent income or wealth of a country. If households 
must first achieve a subsistence consumption level, and then allow intertemporal considerations to 
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guide their consumption choices for the residual of their budget left after subsistence needs are met.  
Hence, in countries where the representative household consumption is close to subsistence levels, 
consumption and saving will be insensitive to changes in the real rate of interest In wealthier countries, 
consumption would decline and saving increase following an increase in the real interest rate.4    
2. The credit channel  
                                                 
4For models that stress the role played by subsistence considerations in consumption and 
saving decisions, see Rebelo(1992) and Easterly(1994). 
Not all households have access to credit markets. Consequently, some households have no 
ability to smooth consumption over time, at least through intermediation afforded through the formal 
financial sector.   Liquidity constrained households determine their consumption and saving on the 
basis of their  current income.  Relaxing the liquidity constraints on borrowers that used to be rationed 
out of the market, may produce a consumption boom and a decline in aggregate saving. The more 
binding the constraints and the greater the proportion of constrained consumers before the 
liberalization of the financial markets, the greater the consumption boom that may be expected after 
the reforms. 
 
 8 
The idea that aggregate consumption and saving patterns respond not just to changes in 
permanent income, but also to changes in current income is associated with the work of Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989, 1993)5. Hence, a reduction in reserve requirements may make more resources available 
for lending, especially to households. Also, a redirection of credit may also favor consumers, loosening 
their liquidity constraints. At the microeconomic level, a privatized and more competitive banking 
sector may search the additional business of consumer lending.   
Many of the past liberalization episodes unleashed a period of rapid growth in bank lending, 
asset price booms, and increases in consumption that often coincided with a decline in private saving 
rates.  Many of those episodes also ended in a full-fledged financial crisis.  Hence, no analysis of 
saving is complete without an assessment of the pervasiveness of liquidity constraints. 
 Section III Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries: 
 A Review of the Empirical Literature 
 
                                                 
5Interestingly however, Campbell and Mankiw(1993) find no evidence that the fraction 
of constrained consumers declined during their sample period -up to 1988- in the industrial 
countries in their sample.    
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The empirical literature tends to reflect the theoretical ambiguities presented above.6 Though it 
mostly confirms the separate importance of  subsistence consumption and the pervasiveness of 
liquidity constraints for the understanding of saving patterns in developing countries, it remains 
inconclusive on their relative weight, and their ultimate combined effect on savings after financial 
reform.. 
There is little consensus, however, on the interaction between saving and the real rate of 
interest.7  Some research  detected only unimportant effects of changes in real interest rates on 
domestic saving in developing countries.  For example, Giovannini (1985), who examines this issue 
for eighteen developing countries, concludes that for the majority of cases, the response of 
consumption growth to the real rate of interest is insignificantly different from zero. One should 
therefore expect negligible responses of aggregate saving to the real rate of interest.   
In a model with a single consumption good, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) confirm these findings. 
However, when they use a disaggregated commodity structure to account substitution between traded 
and nontraded goods, they find higher and statistically significant estimates of the sensitivity of 
consumption to interest rates. On the other hand, Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart(1996) establish that, 
where subsistence consumption considerations are important, the saving elasticity is not very sensitive 
                                                 
6Reinhart(1999) offers a useful collection of country case studies that complements the 
empirical literature briefly reviewed in this paper.  
7 See, for instance, Savastano (1994) and Schmidt-Hebbel, et al. (1992) for a review 
of this literature. 
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to the level of the real interest rate. In their results, if the country in question is at the lower end of the 
income spectrum, higher saving rates may not follow, even after large increases in real interest rates. 
The growth effects of higher interest rates would also tend to be small for the relatively poor countries.  
Saving may be less responsive to changes in real interest rates in low-income than in middle-
income countries because of the way the credit channel is working in less developed financial systems. 
Rossi (1988), for example, argues that in low-income developing countries that are characterized by 
pervasive liquidity constraints, consumption growth is more likely to follow income growth than 
changes in expected rates of return.8  The empirical evidence confirms the pervasiveness of liquidity 
constraints in many developing countries; however, Haque and Montiel (1989) highlight that the 
severity of these constraints varies considerably across countries.  More recently, Vaidyanathan (1993) 
showed that the incidence of liquidity constraints among households is inversely related to the degree 
of economic development which would imply--following Rossi (1988)--that saving in poorer countries 
should be less responsive to interest rate changes.9  
                                                 
8Deaton (1989) has also emphasized the importance of liquidity constraints in explaining 
consumption/saving behavior in developing countries. 
9Vaidyanathan (1993) also found that financial liberalization in developing countries 
reduced the severity of borrowing constraints.  Although no direct tests were undertaken, the 
implication would be that financial liberalization, by reducing the fraction of households for 
which liquidity constraints are binding, should increase the interest-rate sensitivity of private 
saving.  For a direct test of this hypothesis, see Bayoumi (1993) for the case of the United 
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Kingdom, and Ostry and Levy (1995) for the case of France. 
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This is not necessarily the case for industrial countries. The available, sporadic, econometric 
evaluation of the effects of  liberalization on savings tends to favor the scenario of declining savings 
after financial deregulation. Bayoumi(1993) shows that in an overlapping generations framework 
deregulation increases the sensitivity of saving to wealth, current income, real interest rates and 
demographic factors. Following deregulation, savings decline, to recover only partially over time. The 
scenario is tested successfully with U.K. data. Though his results imply that much of the decline in 
savings was caused by the rise in wealth, financial deregulation also played an important role. 
Lehmussaari(1990) provides similar evidence for a sharp decline in saving and increased sensitivity of 
consumer responses to real wealth after deregulation in the Nordic countries, testing a model inspired 
by the life-cycle tradition.   Jappeli and Pagano(1994) generalize the decline-in-savings result for the 
OECD countries for the period from 60 to 87. In their overlapping generations model, capital market 
imperfections, in the form of liquidity constraints on consumers, increase saving and strengthen the 
effect of growth on saving. Their empirical tests suggest that the deregulation of the 80's contributed to 
the decline in savings in the OECD countries.10   
                                                 
10In a somewhat different line of research that focuses on effects of financial deregulation 
through the housing market, Miles(1992) and Koskela et. all (1992) present additional evidence 
that reducing borrowing constraints affects household savings negatively. Miles for the US and 
UK, Koskela et all for Finland. 
Bandiera et all.(2000) attempt thoroughly to assess the impact of financial liberalization in a 
sample of eight developing countries Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey, and from 
Africa, Ghana and Zimbabwe. Their study covers the period from 1970 to 1994. They construct an 
 
 13 
index of financial liberalization on the basis of eight different dimensions: interest rate deregulation, 
pro-competition measures, reserve requirements, directed credit, bank ownership, prudential 
regulation, securities markets deregulation and capital account liberalization.  This index is used as an 
independent variable along with the log of per capital disposable income, the real interest rate, 
inflation and the government saving rate, to explain the variation in the private saving rate. In 
country-by-country estimations, they find no evidence of a positive effect of the real interest rate on 
saving. In most cases the relationship is negative, and significantly so in the cases of Ghana and 
Indonesia. The effects of the financial liberalization index are mixed: they are negative and significant 
in Korea and Mexico, but, positive and significant in Turkey and Ghana. The long run impact of 
liberalization  is sizeable. Corresponding to the realized change in the index, the estimated model 
indicates a permanent decline in the saving rate of 12% and 6% in Korea and Mexico, and a rise of 
13% and 6% in Turkey and Ghana. A likelihood ratio test within the context of a panel estimation 
rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across countries.  
By estimating augmented Euler equations, a la Campbell and Mankiw, they find evidence for 
the presence of liquidity constraints: for the majority of countries, income is significant at conventional 
levels, and its coefficient is positive and significant when constrained to be equal across countries. 
Nevertheless, they were not able to pin down whether financial liberalization relaxes liquidity 
constraints. Assuming away econometric problems, they suggest that their Euler equation results may 
indicate, at best, that financial liberalization has had little impact on the amount of credit available to 
consumers through the formal financial sector. In summary, they identify no strong and reliable real 
interest rate effect on saving, while the aggregate liberalization index has a mixed record. 
Finally, before we turn to our empirical investigation, a result that emerges from this literature 
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which is of some importanceΒthe household and the business sector may not be reacting similarly to 
the effects of financial reforms. Honohan and Atiyas(1993) using a simple model of intersectoral 
financial interactions, and with data mainly form the early 1980's for developing countries, find 
empirical support for a Αbusiness spending crowding-out≅ scenario: a change in the flow of funds 
from the foreign and government sectors causes, at most, a small response in the flow from the 
household sector by comparison to the response of the business sector.  Exogenous swings in the 
availability of foreign finance, or in the government=s surplus are absorbed, almost entirely, by 
changes in the rate of investment by the business sector. The household sector does not come forward, 
to any large extent, with additional financial saving to compensate for the shortfall in foreign financing 
or government borrowing. 
 Section IV.  Financial Liberalization in Africa: Some Stylized Evidence 
Progress with financial reform in Sub-Saharan African countries has been difficult. Some 
countries advanced faster and with bolder steps, in an effort to bring about radical changes in their 
financial sector and their economies. Other countries made little progress. Within the same country, 
implementation of reforms has been more successful in some areas than in others.  According to a 
recent survey of financial sector developments in Sub-Saharan Africa by the IMF, (Mehran et all. 
1998), countries made more progress in the area of domestic operations, by establishing market based 
monetary policy instruments and procedures, than in any other area of reform. By 1997, in almost all 
countries, interest rate and credit policies had been liberalized, and the cental bank was increasingly 
using some form of open market operations. Still, activity in primary markets was mostly dedicated in 
trading of government securities. Interbank markets were limited and secondary markets, if they 
existed, were at their initial stages.  
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Most countries made substantial progress in liberalizing the current account and in developing 
foreign currency interbank markets. Much less progress was achieved in liberalizing capital account 
transactions.  According to the IMF survey, most countries were still following restrictive policies 
regarding the capital account transactions, maintaining controls over capital receipts and outflows. 
Also, controls over portfolio investment, seemed to discourage private capital flows, in combination 
with the current limitations and inadequacies of the domestic capital markets.11 
                                                 
11Collier and Patillo(2000) provide a thorough investigation of the issues concerning 
investment in Africa. 
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In what follows, we are interested in establishing the emerging patterns of response of the Sub-
Saharan economies to these attempts at financial reform, at the aggregate level. We look at a sample of 
29 of the 48 Sub-Saharan countries for the period from 1970 to 1998.12 For each country we split the 
sample in a ΑBEFORE≅ and ΑAFTER≅ period. The ΑBEFORE≅ period is one of financial repression, 
(interest rate controls, directed credit, etc) of diverse forms and intensity. The ΑAFTER≅, is the period 
after the authorities in the country undertook commitments and adopted measures to move towards a 
more liberal financial system.  In other words, ΑAFTER≅, for the purposes of this study, is not 
synonymous to Αafter liberalization≅ but with Αafter entering a process of financial policy reforms 
towards liberalization≅.  
Appendix  Table 1 reports the dates/years that were chosen as the Αturning points≅ for each 
country. The same table reports the corresponding dates for the other developing countries that serve 
as a comparison group for our study. In the table we report both the domestic and the external 
liberalization Αturning points≅. Our study, however, focuses on the before/after split of the domestic 
liberalization. The corresponding external liberalization dating offers few observations for any 
statistically meaningful testing. Interest rate deregulation was the focal point in deciding the date of the 
Αturning point≅ for domestic liberalization, but not the only consideration, given the many 
components of liberalization. The dating was based on information found in Mehran et all(1998), 
Gelbard and Pereira Leite(1999), numerous IMF Staff country reports for the countries in the sample, 
                                                 
12The Sub-Saharan countries that are not included in the sample, were excluded for lack 
of sufficiently long series, or, for lack of information concerning their financial liberalization 
policies and/or reforms.  
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and sources from national monetary authorities in the respective countries.         
For each of the groups that we identify later in the study, we compare the average behavior of a 
number of aggregate indicators in the BEFORE period to its average behavior in the AFTER period. 
The indicators, besides availability and sufficient length of the series, were chosen on the basis of the 
theoretical and empirical clarifications of the previous part of this paper. Our concern is with 
establishing, to the extent possible: First, the impact of the process of financial liberalization, 
understood as institutional and policy reform on the real interest rate, the spread between deposit and 
lending rate, and the financial depth of the economy, as captured by the monetary aggregates M1/M2, 
M2/GDP, M3/GDP, (Total credit to the private sector)/GDP, (Domestic Credit provided by the 
Banking Sector)/GDP.  Secondly, the impact of interest rate increases and financial deepening on 
saving consumption and investment, as measured by the ratios Gross Domestic Saving/GDP, Gross 
National Saving/GDP, Gross Domestic Investment/GDP,  Private Consumption/GDP Government 
Consumption/GDP and Total Consumption/GDP.. 
In order to detect the presence, or absence, of other influences, -intervening variables-, we 
include in our exercises a number of variables-indicators that have been identified in the literature as 
important determinants of saving. Growth rates, of both GDP and GNP, Per Capita Income, both Atlas 
Method and constant 95US$ series, Inflation, both CPI and GDP deflator.  Another group of variables-
indicators clarifies the changes in the external position, and the potential for influences from foreign 
flows: Current Account Balance/GDP, Gross Capital Flows/GDP, Foreign Direct Investment/GDP, 
Trade/GDP, (for lack of a proper Terms of Trade series), Aid/GNP, Total External Debt/GNP. The 
Data Appendix offers the complete list, the definitions, and sources of the series used in this study. 
In a certain sense, our approach allows us to Αapproximate≅ a reduced form estimation of an 
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aggregate savings equation through a comparative static lense.13 Whatever the groups of comparison 
are, we contrast average behavior DURING the process of liberalization, for most countries the 1990's, 
to the average historical behavior of the roughly two decades of financial repression that preceded the 
reforms.    
                                                 
13See Loayza et all(2000) for one of the most recent reduced form studies of savings 
determinants in panels, that also surveys previous literature. and  Hadjimichael et all (1995, 
1996) for cross country estimation of savings and investment equations.   
The comparisons involve first, Sub-Saharan Africa, as a group, versus other developing 
countries. After establishing the post-reform profile for the whole African group, we delve into the 
diversity of experiences within it.  We compare the responses of the countries that made more progress 
in financial development to the countries that made little progress in that respect. We then contrast the 
behavior of the low income countries to that of the middle income countries, as well as the behavior of 
the severely indebted countries to those that are moderately or less indebted. Finally we contrast the 
group of countries that improved significantly their aggregate saving ratios to a group of countries that 
saw their saving ratios decline significantly, during the liberalization period. 
1. A Comparison of the Sub-Saharan African Experience to Other Developing Countries 
 Tables 1 and 2 report the means and standard deviations for the relevant indicators for the 
comparison groups. Tables 1 and 2 also report the results of two kinds of hypothesis tests: A t-test for 
the equality of means Αbefore≅ and Αafter≅ within each group; an F-test on the equality of standard 
deviations Αbefore≅ and Αafter≅ within each group.  
The main results that emerge are: While the real lending rate increased in both groups, the 
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deposit to lending rate ratios remained at roughly pre-liberalization levels. The spreads are higher in 
Africa. The monetary and credit aggregates go in the same direction for both groups. However, the 
other developing countries start from a deeper position and make more significant progress than 
African countries do. Moreover, while the monetary aggregates show some deepening for Africa, the 
credit aggregate remain statistically indistinguishable from pre-liberalization levels. 
As regards changes in aggregate savings ratios, there appear to be none.  When we look at the 
averages for the groups, neither domestic nor national saving ratios are statistically different in the 
post-liberalization times from their respective pre-liberalization levels. Saving ratios, of course, remain 
much higher in the other developing countries. The levels of domestic investment are somewhat closer. 
However, Africa records a statistically significant decline in its gross domestic investment ratio. 
Total consumption stagnates (=no statistically significant difference in the level of the ratio before and 
after) in both groups, with Africa at a much higher level. Interestingly, there is a reallocation of 
consumption between the private and the public sector in Africa. The private ratio increases while the 
government ratio declines. In the other developing countries private consumption stagnates, and 
government consumption declines slightly. 
While growth stagnates in both groups, at higher levels for the other developing countries, the 
gap between them in average per capita income widens dramatically. While both groups experience 
declines in average current account deficit ratios, which are lower for the other developing countries 
both before and after financial reform, both gross private capital flows and foreign direct investment 
decline in Africa and rise in the other developing countries. Crucially, the average gap between the two 
groups with respect to aid dependency and debt burden widens. 
At least on average, it appears that the other developing countries not only have a longer 
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experience with financial reform, but they also have a Αdeeper≅ experience. Besides the dramatic 
increase of the real interest rate after liberalization and the indiscernible effect of Αliberalization≅ on 
saving , the two groups have little in common. Africa as a group experiences growth rate and income 
stagnation (factors that do not enhance aggregate saving) and high and volatile rates of inflation. 
Inflation in industrial country settings is understood as a signal of uncertainty that triggers the 
precautionary motive for savings. In Africa, it is more likely to be treated as a signal of uncertainty that 
induces consumers to stay away of the intermediation circuit (correlation coefficients and panel 
estimates show inflation to be negatively correlated with saving in Africa instead of the positive 
correlation in industrial countries). 
Financial deepening has not followed financial liberalization in Africa. The monetary 
aggregates made some progress, but the credit aggregates stagnated. In fact there has been a credit 
crunch in many countries in Africa in the last decade. (Nissanke and Aryeetey(1998), Aryeetey et all 
(1996)). Foreign capital flows decline in Africa in this period with a negative impact on investment, 
while aid dependency and debt burdens skyrocket. Aid eases liquidity constraints for those that receive 
it, though its impact depends ultimately on the policy setting through which it is filtered. Debt is likely 
to have an adverse effect on saving, either as a signal of macroeconomic uncertainty and in-credibility 
of reforms, or through the anticipation of future tax liabilities (on this latter point see Hadjimichael et 
all (1996)). In summary, financial reforms were undertaken in Africa under relatively more adverse 
circumstances, and progress in financial deepening is hard to detect at all. Mobilization in savings or 
increases in investment have not been observed so far, at the aggregate level. Negative influences on 
saving (and investment) persist. 14 
                                                 
14A caveat is in order, however, this group comparison and those that follow does not 
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2.  A comparison among the fast and slow reformers 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
allow us to detect movements at the informal sector of the economy. In the case of Africa, and 
for the study of credit and saving this is not a trivial problem, as shown in Nissanke and 
Aryeetey(1998). 
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Appendix Tables 3 and 4 report the means and standard deviations for the relevant indicators, 
and the results of the hypothesis tests. Table 3 presents the results on the equality of means Αbefore≅ 
and Αafter≅ within each group with an asterisk in the after columns, and a test of equality of means 
Αafter≅ across groups in the last column of the table with a double asterisk. The classification of the 
African countries in the sample according to their level of progress in financial development, -
understood here as pertaining to institution building and policy stance, not as financial deepening on 
the basis of monetary and credit indicators- is based on Mehran et all(1998).15 
Appendix Table 2 reports the classification of the countries in the sample according to this 
criterion. Splitting the sample into two groups, only,  obscures somewhat the within group diversity. 
Nevertheless it allows a sufficiently clear first approximation to the issues involved with the 
assessment of the consequences of financial reforms. The classification is based on the profile of the 
financial setting and policy environment of these countries at the end of the period, that is by 1997. 
The less advanced  group is characterized on the domestic front by: some progress in developing 
indirect instruments of monetary policy, at least some limited activity in secondary markets. Operating 
 stock markets, liberalized (or partially liberalized) financial markets in general; market-determined 
interest rates. On the external front they are characterized by restrictiveness in terms of both current  
and capital account convertibility.  The more advanced group has made substantially more progress 
than the less advanced group along the dimensions referred to above in the domestic sector and they 
                                                 
15Similar results can be obtained using an alternative IMF survey, Gelbard and Pereira 
Leite(1999) that reach similar conclusions regarding the degree of financial development of the 
African countries. 
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have achieved, at least, some partial liberalization on the current account, (if not the capital account). 
Our results show that countries with less advanced financial sectors experienced the surge in 
real lending rates, as the more advanced countries did, but also, unlike this second group, they 
experienced, on average, an increase in spreads between deposit and lending ratios.  All monetary and 
credit aggregates indicate that the more advanced countries recorded substantial gains in financial 
depth too.  The less advanced, made little progress in monetary expansion, and credit, either as total 
credit to the private sector or domestic credit provided by the banking sector declined.  Inflation was 
higher on average and more volatile in the advanced group.  Domestic saving ratios stagnated for the 
two groups; it seems at slightly higher levels for the advanced group, but the difference between the 
two after reforms is not significant. While national savings also stagnated for the less advanced group, 
it increased substantially and significantly for the more advanced countries. Domestic investment 
declined for the two groups, significantly for the more advanced.   
The substitution between private and government consumption is more pronounced in the 
advanced group. Nevertheless, this group has a lower private consumption ratio and a higher 
government consumption ratio after liberalization than the less advanced group. Total consumption 
remains at statistically similar levels in both groups, even though the more advanced countries register 
a nominal increase. Growth rates stagnated for both groups, while the income gap between them 
increased substantially.  The current account balance ratio improved greatly for the advanced group, 
much less so for the less advanced countries. Interestingly the gross private capital flows ratio remains 
higher in the less advanced group, as the advanced countries record a significant decline. On the other 
hand, foreign direct investment remains higher in the advanced group. Also, this group is significantly 
more open in terms of trade. Aid dependency ratios register significant increases for both groups, and 
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reach statistically similar levels during the liberalization years in the sample. The two groups differ 
however, along the total external debt dimension. The less advanced are also more heavily indebted by 
the end of the period, though they started at a more favorable position debt-wise. 
The most telling result of this comparison is that the actual setting and policy environment 
matters for the consequences of liberalization. The countries that have made more progress in reforms, 
record also some degree of financial deepening. In fact their record resembles that of the other 
developing countries. 
In the less advanced countries pre-reform patterns persist in saving and investment. The 
subsistence consumption argument would indicate for this group little effect or no effect from the 
increase in the real interest rate on consumption and saving. Credit declines rather than increase. In 
this context, if liquidity constraints remained at pre-liberalization levels for the government or the 
private sector, the offset may have come from abroad: aid and foreign borrowing. A timid version of 
the Αliquidity- contraint scenario≅ of financial liberalization, which results in a decline in saving and 
an increase in private consumption probably applies to the more advanced group.  
3. Comparison between the low- and middle-income countries 
The classification of the countries in the sample across income levels is based on the World 
Bank=s classification for the year 2000 (World Development Indicators 2000); these are reported in. 
Appendix 2.  For our study, we grouped the low income countries on one hand, and the two categories 
of middle income -lower and upper- on the other. Tables 5 and 6 report the usual statistics for the 
relevant indicators for the comparison groups 
The low income group differs from the middle income group, in almost every respect, that is 
according to almost every aggregate indicator used in this study. By the end of the period under 
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consideration they have few things in common besides that the real lending rate increased substantially 
in both. The spreads between deposit and lending rate remain higher in the low income countries. 
While the middle income countries made substantial and significant advances in terms of financial 
depth, both in terms of the monetary and credit aggregates, the low income countries stagnated in 
terms of M2 and M3 ratios and receded substantially and significantly in terms of the credit 
aggregates. In one word, the gap in financial depth between the two groups widened quite 
spectacularly by the end of the period under consideration.  
Inflation has been substantially higher and more volatile in the low income group during this 
period of transition to a more liberal financial regime. The middle income group had experienced 
higher growth rates before liberalization. After liberalization average growth rates declined in this 
group too, so that by the end of the period the two groups recorded statistically similar rates. Despite 
this negative trend, the income gap further widened between the two groups after liberalization. 
Given the above, it follows naturally that the middle income group has substantially higher levels of 
saving and investment than the low income group(both before and after the reforms). It is important to 
notice however, that while the after liberalization decline in domestic saving and investment for the 
low income group are small and statistically insignificant, the decline of national saving and domestic 
investment are important and significant for the middle income countries. 
Among the low income countries we observe the substitution between private and government 
consumption that we noticed elsewhere too: significant decline in government consumption and 
significant increase in private consumption. In the middle income group, private consumption remains 
at pre-liberalization levels, while government consumption rises. The consequent rise in total 
consumption is not statistically significant. Still, the total consumption ratio remains much lower in the 
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middle income group. Both groups register declines in the current account deficit ratios and the gross 
private capital flows ratios, with the declines being greater and significant for the middle income 
countries.  Foreign direct investment rises but not significantly in the low income group but declines 
substantially in the middle income group.  Exposure to trade flows declines for the middle income 
group; despite the decline, middle income countries remain more open to trade than low income 
countries. At the same time, they become less dependent on aid, and their debt burden rises but not 
significantly . For low income countries aid dependency and debt burden climb to precipitous levels. 
In other words, the comparison of the experience of the low income group to middle income 
group offers a similar picture than the one afforded by the comparison across financial development 
levels. The low income group is also the group that has made less progress in financial reforms. The 
contrast between groups however is much sharper between income level groups than financial 
development level groups. The middle income country group pre- and post- reform profile strongly 
resembles that of the other developing countries, the low income group profile sharply contrasts with 
it. 
The high association between income levels and financial development levels makes it difficult to 
disentangle the individual influences that shaped the post reform profile of poor and middle income 
countries. Reforms have advanced little or failed in the low income countries. The areas of little 
progress probably matter a lot on whether financial reform has any impact on the economy. 
At the same time, however, predictions on the basis of subsistence consumption considerations or 
liquidity constraints would be equally compatible with the emerging saving patterns. 
4. Comparison between severely indebted and moderately or less indebted countries    
 The classification of countries by debt level is based on the corresponding World Bank 
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classification for 2000. Appendix Table 2 reports this and other classifications we use. We group the 
severely indebted countries on the one hand, and the moderately and less indebted on the other. The 
tables with these results are not reported here in the interest of space but the picture that emerges is 
similar to that of the other cuts in our sample.  Specifically, because of the significant overlap between 
low income and severely indebted countries, the results of this comparison are to some extent similar 
to those obtained for the comparison between low and middle income countries.  
The gap in domestic and national savings  between the two groups is smaller than the 
respective gap between low and middle income groups. Domestic investment is comparable across 
groups.  
The severely indebted group registered the significant decline in government consumption with a 
significant increase in private consumption that we observed elsewhere, while maintaining similar 
levels of total consumption before and after liberalization. For moderately indebted group, the increase 
in private consumption and the decline in government consumption are not statistically significant, and 
total consumption remained at pre-liberalization levels.  
Though the income gap favors the moderately indebted countries, its magnitude is smaller 
between severely and moderately indebted countries than between low and middle income countries. 
Also, the severely indebted countries have a higher aid dependency and a total debt ratio than the low 
income countries, while the moderately indebted countries have a higher aid dependency and total debt 
ratio than the middle income countries.  Foreign direct investment ratios and urbanization rates are 
similar across debt level groups, while differences in trade openness and age dependency ratios are less 
pronounced between debt level groups than between income level groups. Moderately indebted 
countries registered an improvement in terms of  financial depth, while severely indebted countries 
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tended to register a worsening: their monetary aggregates remained stagnant while their credit 
aggregates declined significantly. 
Severely indebted countries registered  in the post liberalization times inflation rates that were 
almost double those of the moderately indebted, and with standard deviations almost triple those of the 
moderately indebted. In so doing however, the two groups did not deviate significantly from their pre-
liberalization record. Basically, the tale of two Africas does not change significantly -qualitatively- 
when we look at the contrast through the lense of the debt levels.   
 
 
V. Conclusions 
Financial reform in Sub-Sahara Africa started later and under more unfavorable circumstances 
than in other developing countries. Some progress has been made in the front of institution building 
and policy stance as reported by the assessments of international financial institutions. This progress 
however was not sufficient to transform the preexisting patterns of saving and investment in Africa. 
This picture of course is shaped by the overwhelming presence in the sample of the low income, 
severely indebted countries, that are the countries that also made less progress in financial reform. In a 
certain sense, this is the tale of two Africas. The small group of middle income, less indebted 
countries, that made more progress in financial developments, already enjoys some of the Αbenefits≅ 
of financial liberalization, namely declining saving and investment. However, these developments can 
only partly be attributed to the higher interest rates and the monetary and credit expansion that 
followed the financial liberalization. 
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Taking the results of the preceding section at face value, it appears that financial liberalization 
delivers: higher real interest rates (possibly reflecting the allocation of capital toward more productive, 
higher return projects); lower investment, but not lower growth (again, possibly owing to a shift to 
more productive uses of financial resources). Liberalization appears to deliver financial deepening, as 
measured by the credit and monetary aggregates--but, again, low income countries do not appear to 
show as clear signs of such a benefit. Financial deepening has not followed financial liberalization in 
Africa, as it has in other regions. The monetary aggregates made some progress, but the credit 
aggregates stagnated. In fact there has been a credit crunch in many countries in Africa in the last 
decade. One can speculate that, unlike in many other liberalization episodes in other regions, 
liberalization in Africa has not been accompanied by the kind of fiscal discipline that allows credit to 
flow to the private sector.  Indeed, the evidence presented in the previous section is not incompatible 
with a Αcrowding-out≅ environment. 
As regards saving, anything goes.  In some regions saving increased following financial 
liberalization; but in the majority of cases saving declined following the reforms. Thus our findings, 
which are in line with several earlier studies, do not settle the issue of the impact of liberalization on 
saving.  It would appear, though, that those that stress the relaxation of liquidity constraints effects are 
on a more solid footing.  
What financial liberalization appeared to deliver many developing countries is greater access to 
international capital markets, as it is followed, more often than not by significantly higher levels of 
foreign direct investment and higher gross capital flowsΒyet this has not occurred in the African case, 
where capital account liberalization has been more sluggish. 
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As noted, financial liberalization does not appear to deliver unambiguous gainsΒat least from 
the standpoint of growth. However, the evidence presented in Levine (1992) suggests that to the extent 
that financial deepening does take root, it has positive and significant consequences for long term 
growth. Yet, our results suggest that for Africa as a whole, but for the low income countries in 
particular, financial deepening is not guaranteed following liberalization.   
Why then liberalize?  The answer to this question depends importantly on learning from 
history.  Financial liberalization may fall short of delivering the rosy outcome depicted in the earlier 
literatureΒbut given the track record of financial repressionΒit still appears to dominate the alternative. 
 From the numerous financial crises of the 1990s, we know that for emerging markets access to 
international capital markets is precarious in the best of times and nonexistent in the worst.  
International capital flows are volatile and in some regions, notably Asia, appear to become even more 
so following liberalization.  Yet, for countries that need to import capital from abroad, the absence of 
liberalization usually leaves them shut out of international capital markets even in the best of times.  It 
could be said that liberalization is like running in a race, you may run and not winΒbut you can=t win 
if you don=t run. 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000. Period covered in study: annual 
observations for 1970-1998. 
   
Series: Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) (NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS)  
Gross domestic savings are calculated as the difference between GDP and total consumption. For more information, see 
WDI table 4.9. 
 
Series: Gross national savings, including NCTR (% of GDP) (NY.GNS.ICTR.ZS)  
Gross national savings including net current transfers is equal to gross domestic savings plus net income and net current 
transfers from abroad. 
 
Series: Gross domestic investment (% of GDP) (NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS)  
Gross domestic investment consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level 
of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including commercial and industrial buildings, offices, 
schools, hospitals, and private residential dwellings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or 
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales. For more information, see WDI tables 1.4 and 4.9. 
 
Series: Private consumption, etc. (% of GDP) (NE.CON.PETC.ZS)  
Private consumption is the market value of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars, washing 
machines, and home computers) purchased or received as income in kind by households. It excludes purchases of dwellings 
but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes payments and fees to governments to obtain 
permits and licenses. In practice, private consumption may include any statistical discrepancy in the use of resources 
relative to the supply of resources. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
 
Series: General government consumption (% of GDP) (NE.CON.GOVT.ZS)  
General government consumption includes all current spending for purchases of goods and services (including wages and 
salaries). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
 
Series: Total consumption, etc. (% of GDP) (NE.CON.TETC.ZS)  
Total consumption is the sum of private and general government consumption. This estimate includes any statistical 
discrepancy in the use of resources. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
 
Series: General government consumption (annual % growth) (NE.CON.GOVT.KD.ZG)  
Annual percentage growth of general government consumption based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on 
constant 1995 U.S. dollars. General government consumption includes all current spending for purchases of goods and 
services (including wages and salaries). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes 
government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. For more information, see WDI table 4.10. 
 
Series: GDP growth (annual %) (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG)  
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 
1995 U.S. dollars. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory 
of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser prices 
is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. The residency of an institution is determined on the basis of economic 
interest in the territory for more than a year. For more information, see WDI tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Series: GNP growth (annual %) (NY.GNP.MKTP.KD.ZG)  
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Annual growth rate of GNP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. 
dollars. GNP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers plus any taxes (less subsidies) that are not included 
in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (employee compensation and property income) from 
nonresident sources. For more information, see WDI table 1.1. 
 
Series: Real interest rate (%) (FR.INR.RINR) 
Real interest rate is the lending rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. For more information see WDI 
table 5.6  
 
The ratio of the nominal deposit to the nominal lending rate is constructed using the following two series: 
Series: Deposit interest rate (%) (FR.INR.DPST)  
Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. For more 
information, see WDI table 5.6. 
 
Series: Lending interest rate (%) (FR.INR.LEND)  
Lending interest rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers. For more information, see WDI table 5.6. 
 
The ratio of M1 to M2 is constructed using the following two series: 
Series: Money (current LCU) (FM.LBL.MONY.CN)  
Money is the sum of currency outside banks and demand deposits other than those of central government. This series, 
frequently referred to as M1 is a narrower definition of money than M2. Data are in current local currency. For more 
information, see WDI table 4.16. 
 
Series: Money and quasi money (M2) (current LCU) (FM.LBL.MQMY.CN)  
Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. This 
definition of money supply is frequently called M2; it corresponds to lines 34 and 35 in the International Monetary Fund's 
(IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data are in current local currency. For more information, see WDI table 4.16. 
 
Series: Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP (FM.LBL.MQMY.GD.ZS)  
Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. This 
definition of money supply is frequently called M2; it corresponds to lines 34 and 35 in the International Monetary Fund's 
(IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). For more information, see WDI tables 1.5 and 4.16. 
 
Series: Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP (FS.LBL.LIQU.GD.ZS)  
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money, or M3. They are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank 
(M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable 
deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time 
deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. For more information, see WDI 
table 5.4. 
 
Series: Credit to private sector (% of GDP) (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS)  
Credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector-such as through loans, purchases of 
nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable-that establish a claim for repayment. For some 
countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. For more information, see WDI table 5.1. 
 
Series: Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) (FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS)  
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of 
credit to the central government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, 
as well as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits 
but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage 
loan institutions and building and loan associations. For more information, see WDI table 5.4. 
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Series: Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (FD.RES.LIQU.AS.ZS)  
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets is the ratio of domestic currency holdings and deposits with the monetary 
authorities to claims on other governments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector, and other banking 
institutions. For more information, see WDI table 5.4. 
 
Series: Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) (NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG)  
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. GDP implicit deflator measures the average 
annual rate of price change in the economy as a whole for the periods shown. For more information, see WDI table 4.16. 
 
Series: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG)  
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer 
of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. For more information, see WDI table 4.16. 
 
Series: Current account balance (% of GDP) (BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS)  
Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers. For more 
information, see WDI table 4.17. 
 
Series: Gross private capital flows (% of GDP, PPP) (BG.KAC.FNEI.GD.PP.ZS)  
Gross private capital flows are the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows 
recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary 
authorities and general government. The indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parities (see WDI tables 4.10 and 4.11 for a discussion of PPP). For more information, see WDI table 6.1. 
 
Series: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) (BX.KLT.DINV.DT.GD.ZS)  
Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of 
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. For more 
information, see WDI table 5.1. 
 
Series: Trade (% of GDP) (NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS)  
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. For more 
information, see WDI table 4.9. 
 
Series: Aid (% of GNP) (DT.ODA.ALLD.GN.ZS)  
Official development assistance and net official aid record the actual international transfer by the donor of financial 
resources or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor, less any repayments of loan principal during the same 
period. Aid dependency ratios are computed using values in U.S. dollars converted at official exchange rates. For more 
information, see WDI table 6.10. 
 
The series Total External Debt as a % of GNP is constructed using the following two series: 
Series: External debt, total (DOD, current US$) (DT.DOD.DECT.CD)  
Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the 
sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. 
Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars. For more information, see WDI table 4.18. 
 
Series: GNP at market prices (current US$) (NY.GNP.MKTP.CD)  
GNP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers plus any taxes (less subsidies) that are not included in the 
valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (employee compensation and property income) from nonresident 
sources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1.1 :DATES INDICATING THE SWITCH TOWARDS A MORE LIBERAL REGIME 
 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL  DOMESTIC 
 
EXTERNAL 
 
  
Benin
 
1989 1996 India 1992 
 
1991
 
Botswana
 
1991 1995 Indonesia 1983 
 
1985
 
Burkina Faso
 
1989 1996 Malaysia 1978-85,1987 
 
1987
 
Cameroon
 
1990 1996 Pakistan 1991 
 
1994
 
Central Afr. Rep.
 
1990 1996 Philippines 1981 
 
1992
 
Chad
 
1990 1996 South Korea 1991 
 
1991
 
Congo, Rep.
 
1990 1996 Sri Lanka 1980 
 
1978
 
Cote d=Ivoire
 
1989 1996 Thailand 1989 
 
1991
 
Gabon
 
1990 1996
 
 
 
Gambia
 
1986 1988 Argentina 77-82,87,91 
 
77-82,91
 
Ghana
 
1988 1994 Bolivia 1985 
 
1985
 
Guinea-Bissau
 
1989 1996 Brazil 76-79,89 
 
1984
 
Kenya
 
1991 1993 Chile 74-81,84 
 
1979
 
Madagascar
 
1994 1996 Colombia 1980 
 
1991
 
Malawi
 
1988 1995 Mexico 1988 
 
1985
 
Mali
 
1989 1996 Peru 1991 
 
1990
 
Mauritania
 
1990 1995 Uruguay 1976 
 
1974
 
Mauritius
 
1993 1993 Venezuela 91-94,96 
 
89-94,96
 
Mozambique
 
1994 1994
 
 
 
Namibia
 
1991 1995 Egypt 1991 
 
1991
 
Niger
 
1989 1996 Israel 1987 
 
77-79,87
 
Nigeria
 
1987-91,1995 1995 Morocco 1989 
 
1993
 
Senegal
 
1989 1996 Turkey 80-82,87 
 
1989
 
South Africa
 
1980 1983
 
 
 
Tanzania
 
1991 1996
 
 
 
Togo
 
1989 1996
 
 
 
Uganda
 
1988 1990
 
 
 
Zambia
 
1992 1994
 
 
 
Zimbabwe
 
1991 1994
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: CLASSIFICATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
Countries 
 
PROGRESS IN 
FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
INCOME LEVEL/ 
WORLD BANK 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
DEBT LEVEL/  
WORLD BANK 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benin 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY 
 
Botswana 
 
MORE ADVANCED UPPER MIDDLE
 
LESS 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Cameroon 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Central Afr. Rep. 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Chad 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
Congo, Rep. 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Cote d=Ivoire 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Gabon 
 
LESS ADVANCED UPPER MIDDLE
 
SEVERELY 
 
Gambia 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
Ghana 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
Guinea-Bissau 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Kenya 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
Madagascar 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Malawi 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Mali 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Mauritania 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Mauritius 
 
MORE ADVANCED UPPER MIDDLE
 
MODERATELY
 
Mozambique 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Namibia 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOWER MIDDLE
 
LESS 
 
Niger 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Nigeria 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Senegal 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
South Africa 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOWER MIDDLE
 
LESS 
 
Tanzania 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Togo 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
Uganda 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Zambia 
 
MORE ADVANCED LOW
 
SEVERELY 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
LESS ADVANCED LOW
 
MODERATELY
 
 
 
 39 
Table 1. A Comparison of the Sub-Saharan African Experience to Other Developing Countries: Means 
 
  
VARIABLES 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
OTHER DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
  ALL BEFORE AFTER ALL BEFORE AFTER 
   
SAVINGS -INVESTMENT-CONSUMPTION   
   
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS %GDP 12.44 12.72 11.87 20.13 19.73 20.61 
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS %GDP 13.13 12.60 13.93 19.68 19.48 19.84 
GROSS DOM. INVESTMENT %GDP 19.37 19.85 18.44* 23.17 23.12 23.22 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION % GDP 71.77 70.71 73.77* 67.15 67.08 67.22 
GEN. GOVERN. CONSUM.% GDP 15.64 16.34 14.33* 12.75 13.24 12.19* 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION %GDP 87.56 87.28 88.13 79.87 80.27 79.39 
GOV. CONS. ANNUAL % GROWTH 4.18 5.56 1.63* 4.68 5.80 3.43* 
        
GROWTH        
        
GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 3.41 3.62 3.03 4.52 4.71 4.31 
GNP ANNUAL % GROWTH 3.44 3.59 3.14 4.58 4.75 4.38 
        
MONEY AND FINANCE       
        
REAL LENDING RATE 4.48 1.72 8.60* 7.98 5.19 9.63* 
NOM. DEPOSIT/LENDING INT.RT 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.75 0.76 0.75 
M1/M2  67.80 71.58 60.61* 45.13 55.58 32.96* 
M2/GDP  22.13 21.39 23.48* 32.22 28.72 36.28* 
LIQUID LIABILITIES M3 % GDP 23.83 23.19 25.00* 36.54 32.70 40.98* 
TOT. CREDIT/PRIV.SECTOR %GDP 19.72 19.29 20.53 33.11 27.34 39.81* 
DOM.CREDIT BY BANK.SECT. %GDP  28.10 28.37 27.59 49.51 45.67 54.00* 
BANK LIQUID RESERVES TO ASSETS  16.83 17.56 15.44 17.01 20.24 13.23* 
        
INFLATION - GDP DEF.ANNUAL % 14.67 13.92 16.10 101.12 77.97 127.60 
INFLATION - CPI ANNUAL % 16.39 15.97 17.01 97.48 72.53 126.41 
        
OPENNESS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES      
        
CURR. ACC. BALANCE %GDP -6.49 -7.45 -5.07* -3.07 -3.17 -2.99 
GROSS PRIV.CAP. FLOWS %GDP 4.82 5.30 4.07* 3.95 3.22 4.47* 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT %GDP 0.87 0.92 0.75 1.08 0.55 1.67* 
TRADE % OF GDP 65.23 64.74 66.17 47.93 42.91 53.75* 
AID % GNP  11.70 9.82 15.42* 1.83 1.92 1.74 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT % GNP 81.36 61.24 119.82* 46.99 41.69 52.43* 
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Table 2. A Comparison of the Sub-Saharan African Experience to Other Developing Countries:  
Standard Deviations 
 
  
VARIABLES 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
OTHER DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
  ALL BEFORE AFTER ALL BEFORE AFTER 
   
SAVINGS -INVESTMENT-CONSUMPTION   
   
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS %GDP 13.61 14.80 10.91* 8.32 8.38 8.23 
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS %GDP 10.87 11.95 8.95* 7.96 7.56 8.29 
GROSS DOM. INVESTMENT %GDP 8.98 9.81 6.98* 6.33 6.05 6.64 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION % GDP 15.54 16.42 13.52* 7.80 7.61 8.04 
GEN. GOVERN. CONSUM.% GDP 6.39 6.81 5.27* 5.87 6.65 4.76* 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION %GDP 13.61 14.80 10.91* 8.32 8.38 8.23 
GOV. CONS. ANNUAL % GROWTH 15.40 13.71 17.87* 7.67 8.86 5.86* 
        
GROWTH        
        
GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 6.24 6.92 4.67* 4.30 4.31 4.28 
GNP ANNUAL % GROWTH 6.77 7.41 5.34* 4.72 4.61 4.85 
        
MONEY AND FINANCE       
        
REAL LENDING RATE 13.22 12.85 12.72 18.17 21.48 15.72* 
NOM. DEPOSIT/LENDING INT.RT 0.16 0.14 0.19* 0.23 0.19 0.24* 
M1/M2  18.45 17.98 17.18 22.17 20.53 17.30* 
M2/GDP  10.94 10.02 12.36* 17.97 15.39 19.82* 
LIQUID LIABILITIES M3 % GDP 11.77 10.88 13.19* 19.58 17.76 20.67* 
TOT. CREDIT/PRIV.SECTOR %GDP 15.96 11.23 22.25* 23.03 15.46 28.06* 
DOM.CREDIT BY BANK.SECT. %GDP  23.67 19.17 30.30* 30.16 28.52 31.43* 
BANK LIQUID RESERVES TO ASSETS  41.70 50.39 14.89* 16.75 20.18 10.34* 
        
INFLATION - GDP DEF.ANNUAL % 21.86 20.82 23.69* 634.16 470.17 780.67* 
INFLATION - CPI ANNUAL % 23.66 22.74 25.00 616.24 389.82 802.37* 
        
OPENNESS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES      
        
CURR. ACC. BALANCE %GDP 9.10 9.19 8.81 4.49 5.13 3.87* 
GROSS PRIV.CAP. FLOWS %GDP 6.68 7.59 4.86* 3.55 3.60 3.42 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT %GDP 2.13 2.42 1.39* 1.57 1.02 1.85* 
TRADE % OF GDP 28.17 28.44 27.66 28.32 23.53 32.09* 
AID % GNP  11.69 10.34 13.24* 2.83 2.81 2.86 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT % GNP 73.48 58.04 83.94* 26.72 27.33 24.98 
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 Table 3.A comparison among the fast and slow reformers: Means 
 
VARIABLES  Group with Little Progress in Financial 
Development   
Group with More Progress in 
Financial Development 
   ALL BEFORE AFTER ALL BEFORE AFTER 
     
SAVINGS -INVESTMENT-CONSUMPTION    
     
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS %GDP 11.32 11.37 11.21 14.61* 15.46 13.07 
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS %GDP 11.90 12.07 11.64 15.64* 13.73 18.31* 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT %GDP 19.05 19.42 18.29 20.00 20.71 18.70* 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION % GDP 74.05 73.26 75.65 67.02* 64.93 70.39* 
GEN. GOVERN. CONSUM.% GDP 14.64 15.39 13.12* 17.76* 18.51 16.55* 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION %GDP 88.68 88.63 88.79 85.39* 84.54 86.93 
GOV. CONS. ANNUAL % GROWTH 4.19 5.43 1.67* 4.16 5.87 1.54* 
         
GROWTH AND INCOME       
         
GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 2.95 3.11 2.64 4.37* 4.75 3.75 
GNP ANNUAL % GROWTH 2.91 3.02 2.68 4.53* 4.87 3.98 
         
MONEY AND FINANCE       
         
REAL LENDING RATE 5.59 2.97 10.39* 2.54* -1.01 6.32* 
NOM. DEPOSIT/LENDING INT.RT 0.51 0.53 0.48* 0.64* 0.64 0.64 
M1/M2   75.30 78.57 68.59* 51.89* 55.47 46.07* 
M2/GDP   18.78 18.32 19.68* 28.96* 28.04 30.48 
LIQUID LIABILITIES M3 % GDP 19.98 19.62 20.67 31.59* 30.81 32.88 
TOT. CREDIT/PRIV.SECTOR %GDP 17.05 18.54 14.17* 25.21* 20.88 32.75* 
DOM.CREDIT BY BANK.SECT. %GDP  23.84 24.90 21.80* 36.96* 35.93 38.72 
BANK LIQUID RESERVES TO ASSETS  16.08 16.06 16.13 18.37 20.90 14.18* 
INFLATION - GDP DEF.ANNUAL % 12.07 11.76 12.71 20.10* 18.77 22.30 
INFLATION - CPI ANNUAL % 13.44 13.34 13.61 22.26* 21.69 23.00 
         
         
CURR. ACC. BALANCE %GDP -7.09 -7.36 -6.67 -5.18* -7.67 -1.97* 
GROSS PRIV.CAP. FLOWS %GDP 4.98 5.04 4.88 4.49 5.89 2.68* 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT %GDP 0.80 0.88 0.63 1.03 1.02 1.04 
TRADE % OF GDP  60.50 59.86 61.78 74.45* 74.60 74.18 
AID % GNP  11.36 9.58 14.99* 12.48 10.39 16.31* 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT % GNP 81.28 58.02 126.48* 81.55 69.29 104.08* 
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 Table 3.A comparison among the fast and slow reformers: Standard deviations 
 
VARIABLES  Group with Little Progress in Financial 
Development   
Group with More Progress in Financial 
Development 
   ALL BEFORE AFTER ALL BEFORE AFTER 
     
SAVINGS -INVESTMENT-CONSUMPTION    
     
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS %GDP 13.78 15.02 10.89* 13.01 13.99 10.90* 
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS %GDP 9.40 10.59 7.17* 13.04 14.41 10.34* 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT %GDP 9.27 9.86 7.90* 8.35 9.68 4.93* 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION % GDP 14.72 15.90 11.84* 16.15 16.18 15.61 
GEN. GOVERN. CONSUM.% GDP 5.81 6.50 3.63* 7.02 7.02 6.88 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION %GDP 13.78 15.02 10.89* 13.01 13.99 10.90* 
GOV. CONS. ANNUAL % GROWTH 16.94 14.73 20.53* 11.41 10.91 11.72 
         
GROWTH AND INCOME       
         
GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 6.50 7.15 4.93* 5.54 6.24 4.07* 
GNP ANNUAL % GROWTH 6.71 7.32 5.27* 6.78 7.49 5.39* 
         
MONEY AND FINANCE       
         
REAL LENDING RATE 13.01 12.51 12.58 13.41 13.21 12.62 
NOM. DEPOSIT/LENDING INT.RT 0.16 0.13 0.20* 0.14 0.13 0.14 
M1/M2   13.24 12.77 11.57 17.86 17.95 16.20 
M2/GDP   6.16 6.46 5.42* 14.75 12.77 17.50* 
LIQUID LIABILITIES M3 % GDP 6.37 6.72 5.58* 15.69 13.78 18.44* 
TOT. CREDIT/PRIV.SECTOR %GDP 9.34 8.98 9.37 23.55 14.82 32.52* 
DOM.CREDIT BY BANK.SECT. %GDP  11.95 11.80 11.99 36.28 28.01 47.27* 
BANK LIQUID RESERVES TO ASSETS  49.14 59.00 16.34* 18.24 20.84 11.76* 
         
INFLATION - GDP DEF.ANNUAL % 16.49 16.15 17.17 29.43 28.09 31.54 
INFLATION - CPI ANNUAL % 16.98 16.54 17.72 32.45 31.70 33.57 
         
OPENNESS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES      
         
CURR. ACC. BALANCE %GDP 9.07 9.26 8.77 9.06 9.04 8.08 
GROSS PRIV.CAP. FLOWS %GDP 6.43 6.86 5.64* 7.16 9.04 2.60* 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT %GDP 2.04 2.31 1.29* 2.34 2.67 1.57* 
TRADE % OF GDP  25.37 26.31 23.39 30.98 30.05 32.74 
AID % GNP  10.99 9.91 12.18* 13.13 11.29 15.30* 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT % GNP 73.57 53.05 85.98* 73.42 68.51 77.20 
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 Table 5. Comparison between the low- and middle-income countries: Means 
 
VARIABLES  Group of Low Income Countries Group of Lower and Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
    
   ALL BEFORE AFTER ALL BEFORE AFTER 
    
SAVINGS -INVESTMENT-CONSUMPTION   
    
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS %GDP 9.14 9.40 8.63 28.53* 29.97 26.10 
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS %GDP 10.38 9.92 11.13 27.45* 29.92 24.98* 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT %GDP 17.92 18.01 17.74 26.48* 29.43 21.48* 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION % GDP 75.72 74.35 78.36* 53.04* 52.69 53.65 
GEN. GOVERN. CONSUM.% GDP 15.06 16.13 12.99* 18.42* 17.35 20.25* 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION %GDP 90.86 90.60 91.37 71.47* 70.03 73.90 
GOV. CONS. ANNUAL % GROWTH 3.84 5.29 1.03* 5.97* 7.19 4.24 
         
GROWTH       
         
GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 3.01 3.02 2.98 5.40* 6.68 3.25* 
GNP ANNUAL % GROWTH 3.00 2.92 3.15 5.58* 7.05 3.10* 
         
MONEY AND FINANCE       
         
REAL LENDING RATE 4.27 1.54 8.89* 5.35 2.72 7.72* 
NOM. DEPOSIT/LENDING INT.RT 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.66* 0.69 0.63* 
M1/M2   72.18 75.42 65.64* 43.55* 47.08 38.68* 
M2/GDP   19.67 19.55 19.90 35.04* 32.24 39.01* 
LIQUID LIABILITIES M3 % GDP 21.21 21.24 21.16 37.45* 34.51 41.74* 
TOT. CREDIT/PRIV.SECTOR %GDP 16.80 18.24 14.01* 34.82* 25.31 49.00* 
DOM.CREDIT BY BANK.SECT. %GDP  25.92 27.88 22.11* 39.74* 31.36 51.54* 
BANK LIQUID RESERVES TO ASSETS  18.48 18.96 17.53 7.91* 9.15 6.06* 
         
INFLATION - GDP DEF.ANNUAL % 15.42 14.37 17.47 11.03* 11.61 10.05 
INFLATION - CPI ANNUAL % 17.89 17.39 18.62 10.29* 10.44 10.04 
         
OPENNESS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES      
         
CURR. ACC. BALANCE %GDP -7.68 -8.19 -6.87 -0.33* -2.76 2.11* 
GROSS PRIV.CAP. FLOWS %GDP 4.29 4.61 3.76 7.42* 9.46 5.26* 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT %GDP 0.80 0.78 0.85 1.32 1.91 -0.04* 
TRADE % OF GDP  59.60 58.08 62.64* 92.77* 99.24 81.78* 
AID % GNP  12.97 10.63 17.59* 4.12* 4.96 2.45* 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT % GNP 87.12 64.78 129.09* 40.17* 37.17 46.70 
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 Table 6. Comparison between the low- and middle-income countries: Standard Deviations 
 
VARIABLES  Group of Low Income Countries Group of Lower and Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
    
   ALL BEFORE AFTER ALL BEFORE AFTER 
    
SAVINGS -INVESTMENT-CONSUMPTION   
    
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS %GDP 10.79 11.96 7.95* 14.48* 16.16 10.79* 
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS %GDP 8.64 9.61 6.68* 10.03* 11.08 8.23* 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT %GDP 7.87 8.23 7.10* 10.58* 11.70 5.54* 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION % GDP 12.72 13.98 9.31* 14.00 15.82 10.31* 
GEN. GOVERN. CONSUM.% GDP 6.28 7.02 3.76* 6.18 5.57 6.78 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION %GDP 10.79 11.96 7.95* 14.48* 16.16 10.79* 
GOV. CONS. ANNUAL % GROWTH 16.20 13.92 19.63* 10.01* 12.34 4.74* 
         
GROWTH        
         
GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 5.79 6.18 4.94* 7.80* 9.32 3.27* 
GNP ANNUAL % GROWTH 6.20 6.47 5.65* 8.77* 10.44 3.72* 
         
MONEY AND FINANCE       
         
REAL LENDING RATE 13.97 13.40 13.73 9.44* 9.16 9.13 
NOM. DEPOSIT/LENDING INT.RT 0.15 0.13 0.19* 0.15 0.10 0.18* 
M1/M2   14.69 14.20 13.47 18.37* 20.26 14.19* 
M2/GDP   6.82 6.97 6.54 17.54* 16.49 18.39 
LIQUID LIABILITIES M3 % GDP 7.39 7.66 6.86 18.85* 17.79 19.70 
TOT. CREDIT/PRIV.SECTOR %GDP 9.68 9.44 9.55 28.65* 17.26 35.77* 
DOM.CREDIT BY BANK.SECT. %GDP  15.26 15.25 14.57 46.53* 34.47 57.88* 
BANK LIQUID RESERVES TO ASSETS  45.12 54.22 15.62* 6.86* 8.09 3.82* 
         
INFLATION - GDP DEF.ANNUAL % 23.47 22.17 25.74* 10.45* 11.46 8.49* 
INFLATION - CPI ANNUAL % 26.00 25.08 27.31 6.69* 6.58 6.93 
         
OPENNESS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES      
         
CURR. ACC. BALANCE %GDP 8.79 8.77 8.78 8.22 10.41 4.00* 
GROSS PRIV.CAP. FLOWS %GDP 6.27 6.89 5.01* 7.96* 10.00 4.05* 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT %GDP 1.99 2.26 1.27* 2.95* 3.12 1.94* 
TRADE % OF GDP  24.85 24.27 25.74 27.31 23.00 30.60* 
AID % GNP  12.09 10.84 13.09* 3.70* 4.08 1.95* 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT % GNP 76.13 60.95 83.82* 25.36* 18.97 35.09* 
 
 
 
 
